What Awaits the Next Chaldean Patriarch? Part Four – Final

Deacon Sabah Hana Alshekh

In the first three messages, we tried to clarify the features of the coming phase and what awaits the next Chaldean Patriarch in terms of thorny, complex, and politically explosive files—both Vatican-related and within the Chaldean Synod. We pointed out that the opposition of the five bishops is not new, and that it will assert a stronger and more influential presence in the coming phase, especially with the Chaldean diaspora bishops largely ignoring what is happening in Iraq. They believe—indeed, they have affirmed on more than one occasion—that the coming years will witness the migration of the remaining Chaldeans from Iraq toward their dioceses, and that they must prepare for this. The truth that the Chaldean public does not want to hear is that the majority of Chaldeans are now settled in the diaspora and none of them are thinking of returning. Rather, we receive news from relatives and friends in Iraq that there is no life and no future for their families in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey, and they are waiting for the earliest opportunity to emigrate.

Chaldean parishes in the diaspora have begun dealing with the second and third generations. They must pastorally connect with these generations and address their spiritual and pastoral needs through priests born in the diaspora who know how to communicate with them. There is no longer a need to import priests from Iraq due to cultural differences and the presence of a sufficient number of priests in America, Canada, and Australia to cover diocesan pastoral needs. Is the next patriarch ready to lead a Church whose geographic center is no longer in its historical homeland? Will Iraq truly remain the “heart,” or will it become only a “memory”? If the human hemorrhage continues, what will remain to be governed: a living people or a fading legacy? Does the patriarch have a clear vision for a Church of the diaspora, or will he continue thinking with the mentality of a local Church that no longer exists?

Can the new patriarch ask diaspora bishops to pay attention to Iraq while they are immersed in increasing daily pastoral challenges? Is Iraq still a priority for them, or has it become a secondary item on a crowded agenda? If the priorities of الداخل والخارج differ, who sets the direction? Who makes concessions? Can a unified ecclesial decision be built while pastoral reality is divided between two different worlds?

There is a noticeable increase in the pastoral needs of the community here in America, for example. This ministry requires more time and effort at the expense of attention to what is happening in the homeland. There is also an urgent need for more priests born in the diaspora, and for financial funding for pastoral activities and programs—at a time when the crisis of our diocese in Santiago has created a rift in relationships and broken people’s trust that their money is safeguarded and in trustworthy hands. Can the next patriarch rebuild financial trust after it has been shaken? Is changing individuals enough, or is a complete change in administrative systems and transparency required? How will he convince the faithful that their money is safe, given a memory that has not yet faded? Does he realize that the loss of financial trust is more dangerous than the loss of financial support itself? All these are practical challenges that must be addressed. The patriarch’s question then becomes: Can I rely on diaspora bishops for counsel and decision-making? Do they have the ability to communicate, or must I wait for the Synod to convene for a few days of discussion followed by months of forgetfulness?

Returning to Iraq, and clarifying a file no less dangerous than the others: the reader or observer may not know that the previous patriarch undermined the file of ecumenical relations with other churches during his patriarchate. This had a negative impact on the Chaldean Church, which was sidelined and marginalized by other churches—especially the Assyrian and Syriac churches—supported by a political party opposed to the former Chaldean patriarch. They exploited the resulting vacuum and forcefully inserted themselves to assert their presence and ability to shape decisions, standing against the former patriarch and obstructing his directions. He was unable to pass the name of the head of the office, nor did he succeed in obtaining the ministry or positions allocated to Christians. This was the first reason he mentioned for his resignation, which the Holy See accepted in less than 24 hours—sending him an implicit message: we are tired of you and your administration.

Churches in Iraq have settled into this reality and do not wish to see a strongly influential Chaldean patriarch who might disrupt it. They know how they will deal with him. If he continues the approach of the previous patriarch, they will continue exclusion and marginalization. If he chooses another approach, they will try to absorb and contain him, since he seeks their friendship and goodwill—and they will not grant it freely unless he concedes Chaldean rights. Can the patriarch rebuild relations with other churches, or has the era of trust ended? Will he enter from a position of parity—asserting authority, leadership, and primacy as his predecessor demanded—or from the position of one seeking acceptance? If the price of “good relations” is concession, where is the limit? Will he seek a genuine partnership, or a temporary truce that hides a deeper conflict?

All that remains to be said is: the inheritance is heavier than what the previous patriarch received.

May the Lord protect the coming patriarch.