Deacon Sabah Hana Alshekh
Part Two
The greatest challenge facing the new Chaldean Patriarch will be the nature of his relationship with the Eastern Congregation in the Vatican, which—according to the former Patriarch—has begun intervening in every detail, monitoring even the smallest matters with suffocating bureaucracy. This dynamic intensified especially after the current cardinal assumed office, ending the influence of the former cardinal, a friend of the previous Chaldean Patriarch, who—according to the late Bishop Hanna Zora and the late Bishop Sarhad Jamo—had the decisive word in his election in 2013.
The Eastern Congregation no longer gives weight to the decisions and positions of the former Patriarch, as he embarrassed the Vatican on several occasions—particularly after revealing what took place during the papal election sessions. It is said “in the corridors of the Vatican” that he overstepped the Congregation’s authority and communicated with the Holy See through alternative Vatican channels in an attempt to influence its decisions, disregarding the established administrative hierarchy.
A Patriarch who did not understand the limits of his authority nor his identity—despite declaring loyalty and obedience to the Holy See, the highest authority in the Catholic Church. He seemed to consider himself the pope of the Chaldean Church, when in reality all he could do was write to the Vatican or the Pope, who would then refer the matter to the Eastern Congregation and await a response.
It is enough to note that the former Patriarch did not receive even a single line of rebuke from the Vatican against the opposing bishops, despite his fiery statements on the patriarchal website against them—statements that inflamed public discourse and divided the Chaldean community into supporters and opponents, in an attempt to demonize and discredit them.
For its part, the Eastern Congregation—especially after the opposition of five bishops to the former Patriarch—has maintained direct oversight and close monitoring of the Chaldean Church. It does not hesitate to halt any measure it deems inappropriate, suspend synodic decisions, or disregard them altogether. The summoning of Chaldean bishops to Rome for the electoral synod carries a clear message to them and to the new Patriarch: oversight is present, trust is not automatic, “our ears hear, our eyes watch, and we read every complaint that reaches us—so do not expect to fare better than your predecessor.”
The support of the former cardinal and other friendly cardinals has ended. Doors will not open easily upon request—you may ask your predecessor, who requested several meetings with Pope Francis but was not granted one, reportedly due to the Pope’s illness.
The new Patriarch will enter into a delicate and complex relationship with the Vatican: if he insists on independence as his predecessor did, he will be accused of rebellion, doors will close again, and he may lose whatever support he has. If he leans too far toward obedience, he may be seen as having lost initiative, and will face criticism from the former Patriarch—who has continued media appearances since his resignation instead of withdrawing to prayer, as he claims. This could drag the Church into another crisis, dividing it between supporters of the former Patriarch—who claim authenticity and independence—and supporters of the new Patriarch—accused of submission to the Vatican.
It is no secret that supporters of the former Patriarch recently called, in a post, for a “new Yohannan Sulaqa” and for separation from the Vatican in order to preserve the dignity of the Chaldean Church. Will the new Patriarch read this reality objectively, or ignore it only to collide with it later? Will he build a clear institutional relationship, or attempt to revive personal ties that have already proven fragile in times of crisis? And what will he do when his decisions are rejected, frozen, or shelved? Will he escalate, contain, or retreat?
The crisis of the Bishop of Santiago also created a state of mistrust in the Vatican regarding the previous leadership’s ability to manage the phase and contain crises. Criticism accumulated, especially regarding unilateral decision-making and the loss of synodic support for the Patriarch. The Congregation will demand real—not formal—consensus, examining decision-making mechanisms within the synod, and verifying whether genuine synodic consultation exists.
One reality cannot be ignored: the era of unilateral decision-making is over. Any attempt to bypass the synod will be met not only with opposition, but with obstruction—something the former Patriarch himself acknowledged: “They do not respect us; they exercise authority over us.”
The new Patriarch must also recognize that some Chaldean bishops have their own channels with the Vatican and direct relationships with decision-making circles, along with influential media presence. This has made them more independent in their decisions. The Patriarch is no longer the sole authority in the Chaldean Church, but part of a complex network of influences.
If the new Patriarch cannot unite the bishops around him and gain their trust, no external relationship will protect him, nor will connections outside the Chaldean synod save him. If he loses the synod, he loses everything—even if he appears outwardly strong, as his predecessor often tried to project in the media.
Can he accept the synod as a responsible partner in decision-making, or will it become a battleground that paralyzes every decision? Can he manage internal disagreements without them exploding publicly? And if “consensus” conflicts with “what is right,” which will he choose?
The previous phase, marked by sidelining bishops and lack of consultation, led to the opposite result: the marginalization of the center itself. The harsh lesson is clear: those who exclude others are eventually excluded, and those who monopolize decision-making ultimately lose it.
The new Patriarch must absorb this bitter truth and begin repairing relationships from within, not from outside—rebuilding trust within the synod before seeking validation in the Vatican through friendships with cardinals or on the political stage through temporary figures and parties.
He must not rely on personal ties with influential Vatican figures—the equation has changed. The Eastern Congregation has placed its full weight behind the Chaldean synod. Whoever is not supported by the synod will not be supported by anyone; whoever is not protected by the synod will not be protected by the Holy See.
The next Patriarch must remember that he is not facing a passing crisis, but a transitional phase similar to what happens in states after the fall of centralized systems: fragmentation of authority, overlapping powers, and a hidden longing for decisive centralized control. Perhaps he should reflect on Iraq after 2003.
Here lies the greatest challenge: to build a system without reproducing the arrogant authoritarianism that led to unilateral decisions and ultimately to the acceptance of the Patriarch’s resignation in less than 24 hours, without consultation.
He must control chaos without suffocating life—a task far from easy, as he will be walking through a field of clustered mines. This may be the last opportunity to reorganize the Chaldean house before such reorganization becomes impossible.
So the final questions remain: will the Patriarch lead the synod, or will the synod lead him? Will he become a unifying authority, or merely one actor among competing internal balances? And if the bishops’ private channels conflict with his direction, will he confront them—or adapt to them?
Stay tuned for episode three
